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condemned out of the mouths of their enemies. The style of the work is sufficiently forcible, and without doubt the volume will prove interesting as well as instructive to the general reader, as the author hoped. Properly used it may be made serviceable as a text-book. It remains to be added that Professor Sears makes no claim to original investigation. He has made wide use of standard authorities and magazine articles, and has usually worked over his material with care. The book ends with a useful bibliography of twenty-three pages.

EDMUND C. BURNETT.

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. By HEREFORD B. GEORGE, Fellow of New College, Oxford. (London: T. Fisher Unwin; New York: New Amsterdam Book Co. 1899. Pp. xvi, 451.)

THIS handsome volume, whose paper, type, maps and general get-up need no praise, is a distinct addition to the discussion of the downward course of the greatest man of modern times. Having read his authorities conscientiously, but rejecting some valuable testimony, Mr. George relies mainly on Chambray, Jomini and Clausewitz, all of whom served through the 1812 campaign, on Buturlin, the Russian official historian, and on Napoleon's correspondence. Secure of his facts, he gives us an easily understood narrative of the campaign; while, writing for an English audience, he naturally lays more stress on Napoleon's desire to "make war on England on the Vistula" than perhaps the true perspective of history warrants. "It was Napoleon's intense desire to crush England which took him to Moscow," says he. The main cause of Napoleon's antagonism to Russia seems to our author to have been its failure to lay an embargo on English goods; and with honest British spirit, when quoting bulletins or letters, he lays undue stress upon the Emperor's "mendacity." The unwilling vassalage of Prussia and the reluctant aid of Austria, as well as their secret anti-French understanding, are much dwelt upon, and the promises held out to Poland to secure its aid: yet these countries were allies on whom Napoleon had a right, from a military standpoint, to count. That Napoleon could hold together the motley host of 630,000 men with which he advanced on Russia, was due, Mr. George maintains, to his admirable corps commanders—but these men were strictly of Napoleon's creation.

The Emperor's projecting half a million men into a country so sparsely settled that it could scarce sustain an invading army of 50,000 was an experiment which earlier in life he would not have undertaken, or into which he would have infused so much more of his own individuality that he might have succeeded. But he was no longer the slim, nervously active, omnipresent man; he was corpulent, liked his ease and shunned bad weather. Except for the migratory invasions of peoples, no such force had ever yet been put into one campaign. Alexander had commanded not more than 135,000 men; Hannibal 60,000; Caesar 80,000, and Gustavus less; while Frederick rarely saw 50,000 men in one body

under his colors. When we consider the small army that a one-track railroad, apart from other means, is thought to be able to supply over a distance of fifty miles, the task in trackless Russia may be partly gauged. Charles XII.'s failure could not deter such a man as Napoleon ; nor was the campaign too bold for him at his best. It had in fact to be undertaken if he would not lose his prestige.

The Emperor's original idea was to make two campaigns unless peace came sooner—the first year's to Smolensk, the next to Moscow and St. Petersburg. But he was insensibly led on to crowd more into 1812 than could possibly be accomplished if luck should run counter to him. When he reached Smolensk, and there, by his own default, failed to beat the Russians in such a fashion as to throw them off their line of retreat and to cripple their army, the campaign was practically lost ; and to continue the march to Moscow was unnecessarily to invite disaster. The diluted victory at Smolensk was the turning-point ; even the Napoleon of 1805 could not then have saved the campaign ; it was the poker-player's instinct which carried him beyond.

When Kutusov sustained at Borodino the bloodiest defeat of modern days, Napoleon was still worse off, for the French were losing their preponderance with every league ; and when, in hopeless anticipation that the Czar would come to terms, Napoleon delayed a month longer in Moscow than was safe, it was his lost ability to gauge facts, his disbelief in failure, bred of the stupendous successes of the past, which lay at the root of his indecisiveness. With the same old mental grasp, he was in character no longer the same man.

All this Mr. George sets down so clearly as to give us a crisp view of the advance, the battles and the horrible retreat. His style is easy and the maps suffice for the general reader. But he is distinctly hypercritical. To the true Briton Napoleon remains a real evil, not a mere historical character, to be calmly weighed in the balance, and he likes not to allow him overmuch credit. As a matter of fact, Napoleon was the most useful man of the century just closing. Had it not been that, in hostility to his arch-opponents, the monarchs of Europe, Napoleon spread abroad some measure of freedom, it is doubtful whether there would be any instinct of liberty on the Continent to-day. Someone had to mold into form the chaotic ideas of the new departure made by the French Revolution, and it may be doubted whether anyone could have done so better than Napoleon.

The Russian Campaign, in conception, was far from being as wild a scheme as Mr. George considers it. Should an Oriental, unfamiliar with the momentous twenty years from 1796 to 1815, read this book, he might almost draw the conclusion that Napoleon was a man of less than common power, sense and judgment, instead of being in our days what Cæsar was to antiquity. In this the work lacks a strength it would otherwise possess ; but in all else it can be commended.

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE.